UNLOCKING 6G'S NEXT FRONTIER:
FROM 5G LESSONS TO A REDESIGNED STANDARDS PLAYBOOK.

INTRO: The sixth-generation network for mobile communications is not simply about achieving faster connectivity; it serves as the foundational infrastructure for artificial intelligence-driven systems that will operate autonomously and are expected to support essential functions across energy networks, transport systems, healthcare, and industrial automation. 6G is also a geopolitical issue. It should consequently come as no surprise that it will influence the geopolitical landscape, shaping who controls the future digital order.

Decisions made today—within forums such as the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) working groups and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which are bodies that play a key role in the development and deployment of telecommunication standards, and supply-chain procurement processes—will determine whether European companies in 2032 oversee networks they played a part in designing, or instead manage standards and infrastructure whose security, vendor dependencies, and artificial intelligence governance frameworks are influenced by external forces.

The study items within 3GPP Release 20, which is the step where the global telecom community finishes improving 5G and starts formally designing 6G—addressing AI-native architecture, security-by-design, spectrum assumptions, and sensing integration—will form the foundation for the subsequent specifications in Release 21, expected between 2027 and 2029. 3GPP Release 21 is where 6G moves from ideas into actual, binding technical standards. Once these decisions are finalised, reversing them would not only pose substantial technical difficulties but also entail complex political, contractual, and financial challenges.

The experience with 5G—characterised by costly rip-and-replace operations, inconsistent security implementations across Member States, and delayed transitions to standalone architecture—demonstrates that retrofitting remains possible but is often prohibitively expensive. In the case of 6G, the window for correction narrows significantly, and the stakes are markedly higher. Because 6G embeds AI autonomy into network control functions, post-hoc correction becomes not only costly but also epistemically opaque—regulators may be unable to determine what requires correction.

This report is built on a distinction the European debate has consistently failed to make: leadership in standards development—specifically, the shaping of technical specifications negotiated within 3GPP—is categorically different from leadership in standards deployment. Confusing these roles has historically limited Europe’s influence across successive generations of networks.

The report contends that the principal barriers to European leadership in standards are not fundamentally technical. Europe is well-equipped, with leading contributors to the development of standards for mobile communication, world-class research institutions, and a robust regulatory framework. What it lacks, however, is a sufficient recognition of the critical role that respect for intellectual property rights, both within the EU and internationally, plays in sustaining EU leadership in standards. This point should be clearly reflected in the EU’s broader 6G strategy.

Three structural measures are vital: mandating security-by-design as a requirement within 3GPP, harmonising spectrum allocations ahead of WRC-27, and establishing a predictable policy environment during the critical period of 2025–2027, which includes stable intellectual property regimes.

While transatlantic cooperation can enhance Europe’s influence, it cannot replace internal cohesion. Without it, the risk is a gradual strategic decline—networks built on standards Europe did not influence, governed by architectures it did not shape, and sustained by supply chains it has failed to diversify.
This trajectory, which the report terms ‘technological museumification,’ would see past achievements preserved while authority over future infrastructure is gradually ceded to actors whose priorities diverge from those of the European Union.

This report also highlights four architectural decisions where European influence remains possible but is constrained by time. These include spectrum-band harmonisation prior to WRC-27, the scope of Open RAN interoperability in Release 20, core-security conformance requirements before the Stage 2 freeze in September 2026, and the guiding principles for integrating AI/ML in Releases 20 and 21.